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Asia, where 30% of the global GDP (based on current market in USD) was produced in 
2014, is fast-emerging as the 21st century’s economic and political nexus.1 This trend has led 
regional and international actors to compete over increasing interests – and the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) is no exception. To secure and protect these interests, Beijing has been 
developing an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD, or counter-intervention) strategy that would not 
only deter foreign military movement into PRC-controlled water and air spaces (anti-access), but 
also disrupt and neutralize them in these areas (area-denial).2 Considering Asia’s seascape 
layout, the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) A2/AD strength has been of particular 
importance.  
Earlier in the PRC’s history, military power was primarily continental and heavily based 
on Mao’s strategy of “human wave attacks.”3 PRC naval presence was secondary, if not 
negligible; for example, Mao-era diesel submarines were too noisy and easily detected.4 Modest 
improvements were made post-Mao, such as the introduction of the nuclear submarine; however, 
a serious lack of software capabilities and inherent technological gaps compared left much of 
these inutile. In the 1980s, more improvements were made – especially in the PLAN – under 
Deng Xiaoping’s “Four Modernizations.” However, one key military campaign accelerated 
China’s military development: the U.S.’s Operation Desert Storm (1990-1991).5 Here, PLA 
                                                          
1 The World Bank. 2015. 2015 World Development Indicators: Structure of Output, 4, accessed December 
16, 2015, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/4.2#  
2 Andrew Krepinevich, Barry Watts, and Robert Work, “Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial 
Challenge” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 20, 2003), ii, 
http://csbaonline.org/publications/2003/05/a2ad-anti-access-area-denial/. 
3 Matt Johnson, “Think Again: China’s Military,” Foreign Policy, February 12, 2010, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/02/11/think-again-chinas-military/. 
4 Jeremy Page, “China’s Submarines Add Nuclear-Strike Capability, Altering Strategic Balance,” Wall 
Street Journal, October 24, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-submarine-fleet-adds-nuclear-strike-
capability-altering-strategic-balance-undersea-1414164738. 
5 Dean Cheng, “The U.S. Needs an Integrated Approach to Counter China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial 





leader noticed the shift from neutralizing adversaries outright to “paralyzing” its movements first 
– a much more efficient, technological approach.6 Hence, the PLA began to rebuild its military 
strategy based on A2/AD (or counter-intervention) approaches. With this, the PLAN has 
undergone numerous A2/AD upgrades since the 1990s – with exceptional improvements made in 
the recent several years. From overhauling its submarine classes to acquiring powerful anti-ship 
ballistic and cruise missiles, PLAN has organized a multi-layered approach aimed at forestalling, 
defending, and engaging adversaries with “increased range, accuracy, and lethality.”7 Ultimately, 
the PLAN’s rising A2/AD regional and global capabilities would help China solidify regional 
security, sustain its growth and development, increase power projection, and reinforce its 
domestic political authority.  
Perhaps one of PLAN’s most formidable and effectual features is its submarines, which 
are primarily dedicated towards anti-surface warfare capabilities (i.e. neutralizing enemy surface 
vessels). Currently, the PLAN has eight submarines classes divided into two categories: the 
conventional diesel-electric (around 50 models) and the nuclear (5 models).8  The PLAN also has 
four boomers, or nuclear attack submarines (these carry nuclear warheads).9  For the diesel-
electric submarines, the PLAN has made substantial improvements. In the late 2000s, the PLAN 
purchased a dozen extremely-quiet, Russian Kilo-class submarines.10 The PLAN itself recently 
engineered the Song- and Yuan-class diesel submarines, both capable of launching anti-ship 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 Maj Christopher J. McCarthy, “Anti-Access/Area Denial: The Evolution of Modern Warfare” (Newport, 
Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War College, 2010), 3, https://www.usnwc.edu/Lucent/OpenPdf.aspx?id=95. 
8 Page, “China’s Submarines Add Nuclear-Strike Capability, Altering Strategic Balance.” 
9 Ibid. 
10 Dean Cheng, “Taiwan’s Maritime Security: A Critical American Interest,” The Heritage Foundation, 




cruise missiles (ASCMs).11 The Yuan-class in particular (officially launched in 2006) has an air-
independent propulsion (AIP) system that allows it to stay submerged longer like its nuclear 
counterparts.12 Since the majority of PLAN submarines are diesel-electric, the Yuan-class is a 
significant upgrade from the noisier Ming-class predecessors commissioned in the 1960s.13   
As for the PLAN’s nuclear submarines, numerous upgrades have also been made. In 
April 2015, the PLAN commissioned three more Shang-class attack submarines, to be fitted with 
the newest YJ-18 ASCMs.14 The PLAN also has four ballistic missile Jin-class submarines, 
which will carry the JL-2 anti-ballistic missile (SLBM) in the nuclear deterrent and counter-
attack capacities.15 The Jin is essentially the PLAN’s most modernized sea-based nuclear 
deterrent to guard against potential nuclear first-strikes and subsequent provocations by rival 
nuclear nations.16 Overall, PLAN submarines function as a very effective means of deterrence 
and engagement for the PRC’s current focus on regional defense.  
In addition to its submarine upgrades, the PLAN has advanced its anti-ship cruise missile 
(ASCM) technologies. Its most recent development consists of the placement of YJ-18 ASCMs 
on the PLAN’s submarines and surface combatants. The YJ-18 – which joins earlier models such 
as the YJ-62 and YJ-83 – has a range of 290 nautical miles (nm), far surpassing the range of its 
predecessor, the YJ-82. The YJ-18 is capable of “sea-skimming” flight at subsonic speeds to 
avoid radar detection; by the time it breaks the radar horizon to strike its target within 16-20 nm, 
                                                          
11 Eric Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving 
Balance of Power, 1996-2017” (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2015), 22,  
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf. 
12 Ibid. 
13 “China Submarine Capabilities” (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury 
Institute of International Studies, July 30, 2015), http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/china-submarine-capabilities/. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance 
of Power, 1996-2017,” 29; Greg Torode, “China’s Island Airstrips to Heighten South China Sea Underwater 
Rivalry,” Reuters, September 17, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china-submarines-
idUSKCN0RH0DA20150917. 
16 Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance 
of Power, 1996-2017," 29.  
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it will be at supersonic speed to avoid enemy anti-missile engagement.17 The YJ-18, with its 
long-range and technical superiority, is therefore PLAN’s most sophisticated ASCM. As such, 
the YJ-18 can serve as a base model for future variants to refit its guided missile destroyers 
(DDGs) as well as nuclear-attack and ballistic-missile submarines.18 
In addition to ASCMs, the PLAN also benefits from land-based anti-ship ballistic 
missiles (ASBM) – more popularly known as “carrier-killers.” The ASBM is revolutionary in 
terms of its huge distance coverage and dual conventional/nuclear capabilities – the DF-21D, for 
example, can travel 810+ nm – reaching far into the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.19 The 
DF-26 can travel 1,620+ nm – far enough to reach Guam in the Central Pacific.20 The ASBM, 
therefore, enhances PLAN’s abilities to conduct far seas and Greater Pacific combat.  
The PLAN has also been making a number of improvements among its surface forces. In 
2012, the PLAN commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning – a Ukrainian aircraft carrier 
from the Soviet era refitted by the PLAN.21 Although the Liaoning will function as a “training 
carrier,” it sets the precedent for future active aircraft carriers to boost PLAN’s carrier strike 
group (CSG) formations, a key component of any near and far seas operations.22 Other PLAN 
vessels that have also met higher specifications, such as the Luyang-class guided missile 
                                                          
17 Michael Pilger, “China’s New YJ-18 Antiship Cruise Missile: Capabilities and Implications for U.S. 
Forces in the Western Pacific” (Washington, D.C.: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
October 28, 2015), http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%E2%80%99s%20New%20YJ-
18%20Antiship%20Cruise%20Missile.pdf. 
18 Ibid.; “The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Office of Naval Intelligence, April 2015), 13, 
http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/china_media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Interactive.pdf. 
19 Henry J. Kazianis, “Lifting the Veil on China’s ‘Carrier-Killer,’” The Diplomat, October 23, 2013, 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/lifting-the-veil-on-chinas-carrier-killer/. 
20 Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories 
and Strategic Implications” (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, May 2013), 
http://www.andrewerickson.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/China-ASBM_Jamestown_2013.pdf; Pilger, “China’s 
New YJ-18 Antiship Cruise Missile: Capabilities and Implications for U.S. Forces in the Western Pacific," 7. 
21 Kyle Mizokami, “The Five Most-Powerful Navies on the Planet,” The National Interest, accessed 
December 14, 2015, http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/the-five-most-powerful-navies-the-planet-10610. 




destroyers (DDGs) (vital in anti-submarine warfare and mid- to long-range missions) and the 
amphibious Yuzhao-class transport dock ships (LPDs) (vital in rapid troops and weapons 
transport for near seas amphibious assaults).23 Additionally, there are the Jiangkai-class frigates 
(now equipped with HHQ-9 surface-to-air missile defense systems), and the Jiangdao-class 
corvettes (perfect for patrolling EEZ waters with its four ASCMs and high maneuverability).24 
The DDGs, frigates, and corvettes in particular have seen marked improvements, as they form 
the bulk of PLAN’s regional combat formations and future transition towards open seas 
engagement.25 The PLAN’s construction of a new cruiser class (which would have land, air, sea, 
and sub-surface missile-strike capabilities) is underway.26  
Other key naval upgrades in the past several years include the new Dragon Eye radar 
system (installed on the Luyang I– and II–class destroyers), the HQ-9 SAM system naval air-
defense system (installed on various combatants), the Luyang-III’s universal vertical launch 
system (VLS), and more.27 These combat management systems, along with other C4ISR 
(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance) measures, provide crucial expeditionary logistics and surveillance sensors for 
successful PLAN missions.28   
                                                          
23 Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance 
of Power, 1996-2017,” 177-180; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, “The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and 
Missions for the 21st Century,” 23.   
24 U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, “The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century,” 
24; Cheng, “Taiwan’s Maritime Security”; Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, 
Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017,” 177-180. 
25 U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, “The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century,” 
43.  
26 Ibid., 10. 
27 Cheng, “Taiwan’s Maritime Security”; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, “The PLA Navy: New 
Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century”; Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, 
Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017.” 
28 U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, “The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century,” 
21-23; Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of 
Power, 1996-2017,” 21-22.  
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Ideally, PLAN’s A2/AD technical capabilities would give China innumerable benefits in 
advancing its tactical and strategic objectives. Tactically, PLAN’s rising capabilities would boost 
China’s regional influence vital to its economic growth, energy supplies, and military security. 
One area of interest is the East China Sea (ECS), in which China has been in gridlock with Japan 
over the territorial rights to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Reportedly rich in oil and natural gas 
reserves, these islands are also strategically vital to China’s maritime security strategy of forming 
a “first-island chain,” which would encompass the Yellow, East, and South China Seas.  Not 
much has happened recently in terms of diplomacy, but for future talks, the PLAN will 
undoubtedly be a part of the PRC’s maritime diplomacy. Should the possibility of a China-Japan 
clash occur, the PRC could have its various ballistic-missile and nuclear-capable submarines 
surround Japan and deploys its ASCM-armed surface combatants – before resorting to other 
measures in the face of U.S. intervention.  
In addition to the ECS, the South China Sea (SCS) is also vital to China’s geoeconomic 
and political interests. In the past decade, China has taken significant actions, such as island-
building on the Spratly reefs and asserting its nine-dash line proposal, a border which encroaches 
upon the 200 nautical-mile Economic Exclusive Zones (EEZ) of six Southeast Asia countries.29 
To help Beijing in its efforts, PLAN upgrades have been employed in effective posturing 
measures. In December 2013, the PLAN launched its first nuclear submarine deployment 
through the region, passing through the Strait of Malacca, a principal trade route in the South 
China Sea.30 Such measures have stoked concern in its Southeastern neighbors, which are 
militarily-weaker and lack in size. The PLAN’s submarines, surface forces, naval air fighters, 
and now physical bases (Spratlys) are enough to eliminate thoughts of direct engagement in the 
                                                          
29 Shannon Tiezzi, “Philippine FM: China’s 9-Dash Line a ‘Berlin Wall of the Sea,’” The Diplomat, 
September 3, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/philippine-fm-chinas-9-dash-line-a-berlin-wall-of-the-sea/. 
30 Page, “China’s Submarines Add Nuclear-Strike Capability, Altering Strategic Balance.” 
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SCS, which would be too costly. Clearly, as PLAN continues to modernize, Beijing will grow 
increasingly confident in securing heavily-used commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 
and militarily-strategic territories.  
Lastly, another key tactical objective is maintaining leverage over Taiwan, both in terms 
of cross-strait relations and military capabilities. Taiwan connects the ECS and SCS, which 
makes it a key part of China’s first-island chain strategy.31 With the PLAN’s recent 
modernizations, the PLA has been able to grow its A2/AD cover over Taiwan without much fear 
of Taiwan’s limited military: the YJ-18 ASCMs, the Jingdao corvettes (first response), the 
Yuzhao LPDs (amphibious invasion), and even the PLAN’s combat aircraft (bombers and 
strikers) can easily overpower Taiwan’s limited air-sea defenses and strike its vital trading 
ports.32 In regards to countering U.S. intervention, the PLAN still has a capability gap in terms of 
anti-submarine warfare and other key systems.33 However, the PLAN can challenge U.S. forces 
by augmenting the logistical complexities to operate in such a heavily A2/AD-controlled zone.  
All these tactical goals are conducive to achieving China’s strategic objective countering 
of U.S. Asia-Pacific influence, which will be necessary if it wants to dominate its near and far 
seas. In the future, as PLAN’s hard-asset equipment, software systems, and logistical measures 
become more sophisticated and integrated, Beijing could have a number of military options. 
Already, the PLAN can conduct far more flexible and thorough air-sea combat with the near-
completion of a 3,000-meter airstrip in the Spratly Islands, with two more in pre-construction.34 
Although Xi Jinping rejects claims that these airstrips will be “militarized,” it is clear that these 
                                                          
31 Cheng, “Taiwan’s Maritime Security.” 
32 Ibid. 
33 Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance 
of Power, 1996-2017.” 
34 Josh Chin and Jeremy Page, “South China See: Satellite Images Show China’s Continued Island 
Building,” The Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2015, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/09/16/south-
china-see-satellite-images-show-chinas-continued-island-building/; Torode, “China’s Island Airstrips to Heighten 
South China Sea Underwater Rivalry.” 
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will be a strategic logistical asset for PLAN in conducting potential missions to forestall, deter, 
and neutralize future U.S. military movements.35  Beijing can also engage ASBMs if the DF-
21D’s predicted strike range is true: 2,700 km is well enough to contain U.S. forces China’s near 
seas and Central Pacific; if Beijing wanted to go as far as Guam, it could use the DF-26.36 In 
addition, PLAN commanders can employ SAGs (surface-action groups) – which are comprised 
of the LPDs and DDGs – to secure various "chokepoints” (i.e. straits) before U.S. containment 
measures take hold.37 From there, PLAN can maneuver its various submarines, launch ASCMs 
and other anti-ballistic missiles, and scramble U.S. command-and-control systems (using 
methods such as cyberwarfare).38 These are all major ways for China to not only deny American 
(or American-led) intervention, but to also deter the justifications and motivations for it in the 
first place (i.e. “mission-kill”).39 For now, China’s “first island-chain” strategy to counter U.S. 
Asia-Pacific influence will heavily depend on successful naval A2/AD control over its near seas. 
Afterwards, Beijing will move forward with its second- and third-island chains, as well as blue-
water maritime operations that cover its SLOCs in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.  
In the big picture, the CCP’s tactical and strategic objectives all point back towards its 
underlying goal: one-party political control over all areas of domestic development. Militarily, 
the PLAN’s counter-intervention systems and measures would contain foreign assistance of any 
internal separatist movements (remember, domestic unrest is handled by the People’s Armed 
Police). Diplomatically, having a strong PLAN – or PLA in general – would reduce and curtail 
                                                          
35 “Showdown in the South China Sea: How Did We Get Here?,” CNN, accessed December 15, 2015, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/28/asia/china-south-china-sea-disputes-explainer/index.html. 
36 Henry J. Kazianis, “China’s New Anti-Ship Missile: A Pacific Nightmare for the US?,” East Asia 
Forum, September 29, 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/29/chinas-new-anti-ship-missile-a-pacific-
nightmare-for-the-us/. 
37 Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance 
of Power, 1996-2017,” 2.  
38 Ibid., 4. 
39 Cheng, “The U.S. Needs an Integrated Approach to Counter China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy.” 
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foreign diplomatic intervention into domestic political affairs. This is important in the long-run 
because the CCP must be in full control over what and how reforms occur. In any case, the 
CCP’s rising military power will affect how it addresses future internal and external political 
issues; after all, the CCP leadership has not forgotten Mao Zedong’s words that “the Party 
commands the gun, and the gun must never command the Party.”40  
In the final analysis, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is no longer a slow, antiquated 
colossus – it is swiftly becoming a streamlined, multi-functional global force with which to be 
reckoned. The PRC’s military leaders may still explicitly label the PLAN as a “self-defense 
force,” but it is clear that as the PLAN solidifies its mainly defensive near seas capabilities, it 
will build its “open seas protection” capabilities as well, in which we may see more offensive 
developments.41 With this, it would be no overstatement to say that as PLAN continues to 
modernize, the Chinese government will continue to gain leverage in furthering its expanding 














                                                          
40Robert Ash, China’s Integration in Asia: Economic Security and Strategic Issues (Routledge, 2013); Mao 
Zedong, "Problems of War and Strategy," in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: Volume II (1938), accessed 
December 17, 2015, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_08.htm. 
41 Edward Wong, “China Expands Naval Power to Waters U.S. Dominates,” The New York Times, April 
23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/world/asia/24navy.html; “China’s Military Strategy,” White Paper 
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